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Abstract- Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have recently attracted a lot of interest in the research community due their
wide range of applications in our lives ranging from military applications to civilian ones.. Due to distributed nature of these
networks and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can
adversely affect their proper functioning. This problem is more critical if the network is deployed for some mission-critical
applications such as in a tactical battlefield. Random failure of nodes is also very likely in real-life deployment scenarios.
Due to resource constraints in the sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overhead of computation and
communication are infeasible in WSNs. Security in sensor networks is, therefore, a particularly challenging task. In this
current paper, we fundamentally focus on the security issue of WSNs and propose a protocol based on public key
cryptography for external agent authentication and session key establishment. The proposed protocol is efficient and secure
in compared to other public key based protocols in WSNs.
Keywords- Wireless sensor networks, Security, Public key techniques, Cryptography, Authentication.

loading the OS and application code. Unreliable
communication is another serious threat to sensor
security. Normally the packet-based routing of sensor
networks is based on connectionless protocols and
thus inherently unreliable.

I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks consist of small nodes that
sense their environment, process data, and
communicate through wireless links. Sensor networks
closely interact with their physical environment and
with people, posing new security problems. Security
in wireless sensor network is different compared to
security in LANS, WANS, Internet etc. This is due to
the constraints of sensor nodes on battery power,
CPU, memory and WSN is Wireless, Ad hoc,
Unattended. Hence it poses new security problems
and research challenges. Many WSN are involved in
critical and secure applications[4] like military
surveillance and Enemy movement, hence providing
security to data is critical challenge.

Security is a very important issue when designing any
network or protocol. The proposed schemes in
literature are not secure, since they use some
simplified techniques to carry out the limitations of
sensors, given that the majority of these protocols
makes use of symmetric encryption for ensuring all
the security services instead of a combination of
symmetric and asymmetric (public) encryption.
This paper proposes a highly secure, low cost and
efficient protocol based on public key cryptography
for external agent authentication and communication
between external agent and base station is through
public key cryptography and communication between
base station and sensor is through shared private key
techniques.

Due to the constraints, it is difficult to directly
employ the conventional security mechanisms in
WSNs. In order to optimize the conventional security
algorithms for WSNs, it is necessary to be aware
about the constraints of sensor nodes . Some of the
major constraints of a WSN are listed below[2].

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 discusses related work in this field. Section 3
discusses security requirements in WSN. Section 4
presents the proposed protocol. Section 5 analyses the
proposed protocol and the security requirements met
by it. Section 6 discusses the efficiency of the
proposed protocol.

Energy constraints: Energy is the biggest constraint
for a Wireless Sensor Networks. In general, energy
consumption in sensor nodes can be categorized in
three parts: (i) energy for the sensor transducer (ii)
energy for communication among sensor nodes and
(iii) energy for microprocessor computation.
Memory limitations: A sensor is a tiny device with
only a small amount of memory and storage space.
Flash memory is used for storing downloaded
application code and RAM is used for storing
application programs, sensor data, and intermediate
results of computation. Usually there will be no
enough space to run complicated algorithms after

II . RELATED WORK
A.Public Key Based Schemes:
Simplified SSL handshake: In [5], the authors give
the energy cost analysis of a simplified version SSL
[8] applied to WSN, which reduces the amount of
exchanged data between any pair of nodes to save
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source i.e Base Station. The external agent should be
authenticated from Base station in order to
communicate with Senor nodes.

energy and bandwidth. The simplified handshake is
used to setup a secure key between any two sensors in
the network as the one in SSL [8]. As a brief analysis
of this scheme, it seems that it is not an energy
saving, since a handshake between each pair of
sensors is too expensive concerning the amount of
exchanged data. Therefore this scheme cannot be
applied to mobile sensor networks, since the mobility
of sensors needs new handshake at each time a sensor
changes its position and therefore its neighbor
sensors, which consumes lot of energy.

Data Integrity: Ensuring that any received data has
not been altered in transmission by unauthorized
parties. The received data by external agent from
requested sensor nodes should be free from any
alteration or corruption.
Availability: Ensuring that services oﬀered by whole
WSN or by a single sensor node must be available
whenever required. Data requested by an external
agent from Sensor node should be available whenever
required.

Simplified Kerberos protocol: The authors in [3]
proposed an adapted version of Kerberos [9] for
WSN in order to setup a session key between each
communicating pair of sensors by contacting a trusted
third party which may be the base station or a cluster
head in a hierarchical network. They assume that a
long term key is shared between each node and the
trusted authority which is responsible for the
generation of the secret key for each pair of sensors.
This scheme is very vulnerable against capture
attacks to which sensors are very often exposed and
as the previous work the handshaking is not energy
saving and it may consume lot of network resources
if the trusted third party is far from the pair of nodes.

Node Colluding: Colluding two or more nodes do not
shape out other nodes.
On explaining our protocol, we analyze and prove
that our protocol satisfies all the above mentioned
requirements of security for WSN's.
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol is based on RSA cryptosystem
[10].The entities in the proposed protocol are
Certification Authority (CA), External Agent (EA),
Base station, Wireless Sensor network which consists
of sensor nodes.

TinyPK: The TinyPK system described in [7] is
designed specifically to allow authentication and key
agreement between resource constrained sensors. The
protocol is designed to be used in conjunction with
other symmetric encryption based protocols as
TinySec [6], in order to deliver secret key to that
underlying protocol. To do this, they implement the
Diffie Hellman key exchange algorithm. As said
above, using a session key between each pair of
sensors is not efficient and it consumes lot of energy
and network bandwidth for the setup of the session
key beyond of the energy consumed by the
encryption algorithms. Using this scheme, as an endto-end security mechanism may be energy efficient,
however Diffie Hellman key agreement is very
sensitive to man in the middle attacks, which can be
easily performed in such situation.

CA: Certification Authority which is having private
and public key pairs and trusted by sensors. The role
of the CA in this process is to guarantee that the
individual granted the unique certificate is in fact who
he or she claims to be.
EA: External Agent is an entity who tries to
communicate with the WSN. External agent also has
a private and public key pair and must be certified by
the CA.
Base station (BS): A Base Station is a signal
transmitter or receiver that controls the local wireless
network and may also be the gateway between
external environment and WSN. Base station plays a
major role in WSN security.

III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN WSN
The security services in a WSN should protect the
information transmitted over the public channels and
the resources from attacks and misbehavior of nodes.
The most important security requirements are given
below:

Sensor nodes: A sensor (also called as mote) which is
a constituent of WSN is capable of sensing,
gathering,
processing
and
communicating
information to BS or EA.

Data Confidentiality: Ensuring that only authorized
external agents can access the content of the
messages. Main part of data Confidentiality comes
when a session key is shared between sensor and
External agent. It must be sent in a secure way
against traffic analysis attack. Data Authentication:
Ensuring that the data is originated from the correct

Algorithm: Communication between EA and BS is
based on RSA based encryption and Decryption.
Communication between Base station and Sensors is
Secret key based encryption and decryption
.Communication between Sensor and External Agent
as discussed in Watro et al [7] by using low key
cryptography.
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The fig 1 shows the architecture of the proposed
system:

N
chk
h()
REQ
t
T

nonce
Checksum
Hash function
Request from EA
Current time
Validity period issued by Certification
authority

Algorithm1: External agent Authentication
If (t<T) then
//At external agent side
C’ EEAPriKey{REQ, N}
chk=h(N)
C’’EBSPubKey{C’||chk}
//Send Ciphertext2 to Base Station
//At Base station side
DBSPrivKey{C’’}={C’||chk}
DEAPubKey{C’}={REQ,N}
//Verify for valid checksum
If (chk’==chk)
Valid checksum
else
Invalid checksum
Authentication failed.
End If
//verify for valid nonce
If(N’==N)
Valid nonce
else
Invalid nonce
Authentication failed
End If
C’’’=Ebi{REQ||EAPubKey||nonce}
//Send ciphertext3 to Sensor i.
//At Sensor side
Dbi{C’’’}
{REQ||EAPubKey||nonce}.
else
//Certification validity period expired
Authentication failed
End If

Fig 1 Architecture of the proposed system

The proposed protocol is explained in three important
phases. Registration, Authentication, and Session Key
establishment phase.
Registration phase: It is composed into 2 phases.
1.In first phase entities involved are External Agent
and Base Station. The process involved is to register
the External Agent public key with Base station.
R1) Any External Agent EAi wants to communicate
with a sensor must be certified by a CA in which the
WSN trusts.
R2) On certified by CA, EAi submits the public key
EAPubKeyi to the base station.
R3) Base station validates the public key EAPubKey
submitted by the External Agent EAi, by checking
whether it is certified by the CA in which the network
trusts.
R4) Once certified the Base station stores the certified
EA IP address, nonce in its database as a record for
the external agent EAi
2.In second phase entities involved are Sensor and
Base station. Each sensor in WSN registers with the
Base station Base station maintains all registered
sensors along with the information of the data each
sensor holds.

A1)Certificate Authority sets specific certification
validity period within which the External agent
should communicate to Base Station for
authentication.

Authentication Phase: This phase involves external
agent authentication from Base station using public
key cryptography.

A2) Any request from external agent i,e REQ to
sensor i, along with nonce is encrypted with external
agent
private
key
called
ciphertext1[1]
C’=EEAPriKey{REQ, N}.

TABLE 1: Notations of Proposed Protocol
Notation Definition
C’
C’’
C’’’
E
D

=

Encrypting the message with private key of EA,
ensures that only EA could have sent it and provides
Authentication of EA to the Base station. To check
the integrity of Ciphertext1(C’), checksum (chk) of
nonce is calculated as chk=h (nonce).The checksum

Ciphertext1
Ciphertext2
Ciphertext3
Encrpt
Decrypt
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is calcuclated using MD5 Algorithm. Ciphertext1 and
checksum of nonce is encrypted with the public key
of base station i,e C”=EBSPubKey{C’||chk} which is
called as Ciphertext2[1] . Encrypting the Ciphertext1
along with chk with the public key of base station
ensures that only base station can decrypt it, thus
providing secrecy of message. Then the message is
transferred over an insecure public channel.

V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR PROPOSED
PROTOCOL

A3)Base station decrypts the message(Ciphertext2)
with
its
own
private
key(BSPriKey),
DBSPriKey{C’’}.On decrypting Ciphertext2 the base
station gets {C’||chk}.Base station decrypts the
Ciphertext1 with the public key of External
Agent(EAPubKey).Once it decrypts Ciphertext1,that
is DEAPubKey {Ciphertext1} base station gets the REQ
and nonce. Base station validates the nonce by
calculating the hash of it using MD5 algorithm. If it is
equal to chk, that is chk = h (nonce), then it proceeds
to next step, else it rejects the request.

Traffic Analysis Attack : This is a special type of
interference attack technique that looks at
communication patterns between entities in a system.
Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and
examining messages in order to deduce information
from patterns in communication. If the entities lack in
communication, denotes lack of activity between
them.

In this section, we show that the proposed protocol
provides security in all the conditions mentioned in
the section 3.Each possible attack on wireless sensor
network and the steps taken by the proposed
algorithm is explained for each attack.

Countermeasure by our proposed protocol:
From the start of communication from External agent
to Base station and transferring of Session key to
External agent are happening only once and in an
encrypted format. Hence it doesn’t give any clue to
the adversary (No mathematical operations like XOR
etc. or not performed on the contents of the message,
if so the adversary can easily analyses the contents of
the message).

A4)The base station updates the nonce in its record
for corresponding External agent, for every valid
request from that External agent.
A5) On Authentication of External agent request, the
base station instructs a sensor node (say ith node) to
respond against EAi’s request. Base station stores a
secret key with each sensor node of that WSN. Base
station
computes[1]
Ciphertext3
C’’’=Ebi{REQ||EAPubKey||nonce} and transfer the
same to the ith sensor node.

Eaves Dropping and Passive Monitoring: The
intercepting and reading of messages and information
by unintended recipients. If the messages are not
protected by cryptographic mechanisms, then
definitely the adversary can capture the message.

A6)On receiving ciphertext3, the Senor ith node
decrypts i.e. Dbi{C’’’} = {REQ||EAPubKey||nonce} .

Countermeasure by our proposed protocol:
Every message that is transmitted between External
Agent and Base station, Base station and Sensor
node, Sensor node and External Agent is in encrypted
formats, hence no scope for Eaves dropping and
passive monitoring.

Session Key
Establishment
phase: involves
communication between External agent and Sensor.
Algorithm 2:

Replay attack : is a form of network attack in which a
valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently
repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the
originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data
and retransmits it, possibly as part of a masquerade
attack by IP packet substitution.

C’’’’=EEAPubKey{TinySessionKey}
DEAPrivKey{C’’’’}={TinySessionKey}
Use TinySessionKey for further communication
S1)In this phase sensor i frames a message i,e
ciphertext 4 C’’’’=EEAPubKey{TinySessionkey}. As
proposed in Watro [7], using of RSA algorithm to
encrypt the message containing Session key with the
public key of External agent assures only External
agent can able to decrypt with its private key, which
assures secrecy, which is an important factor while
transmitting the session key. S2)On getting the
Ciphertext4 the External agent decrypts the message
with its private key and use the TinySessionKey for
further communication.

Countermeasure by our proposed protocol: nonce
which is a non repeated value is used by base station
as a distinguishing factor among requests from
External Agent. In order to replay the valid request
from External Agent, the adversary must know the
nonce, which is not possible. The adversary must
need private key of base station to decrypt
Ciphertext2 to get nonce, which is not possible.
Impersonation Attack (Phishing): It is an attack in
which is an adversary confuses by imitating as
legitimate External agent or a base station. The

S3)Sensor i sets a Session period within which
External Agent can communicate with the sensor for
data it require.
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adversary has to capture the identity of an External
agent to confuse a base station.

Computation Cost Analysis: In the proposed protocol,
the base station mainly performs two decryption
activities provided with huge computational and
energy resources . Base station doesn’t have any
burden on implementing these encryption and
decryption activities. In TinyPk[7] a sensor with
limited resources and energy is made to perform three
RSA based encryption and decryption operations
compared to only one in the proposed protocol.

Countermeasure by our proposed protocol:
If an adversary can get the nonce of the message
(through which a base station distinguishes the
external entities) then it can confuse Base station. As
the Ciphertext2 is in an encryption format and must
be decrypted only by private key of base station,
hence it’s not possible for an adversary to
impersonate External Agent. The entire message
transferring between base station and sensor is done
through a secret key, which is not possible for an
adversary to get the secret key Node Compromise
Attack: occurs when an attacker, though some subvert
means gains control of the sensor node in the network
after deployment. The adversary can simply extract
information vital to network security such as security
keys.

Communication Cost Analysis: Both TinyPk[7] and
our
Proposed
protocol
consumes
similar
communication cost. As specified in [2],
Communication is most costly than computation in
WSN. In our proposed protocol we didn’t increased
the communication cost compared to Tiny PK. A
sensor node in the WSN receives only one message
from base station and transmits only one message to
external agent. Once session key is established
between External agent and the sensor node, the
number of messages exchanged between those two is
dependent on the application.

Countermeasure by our proposed protocol:
The base station will be continuously monitoring
whether any node is captured or not. Every external
Agent or user trying to connect to WSN ,the user
authentication and data access must be done through
Base station and after authentication. If a base station
detects any node as compromised or malicious node,
then the base station doesn’t forward the message to
that node.

VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a public key
cryptography based protocol for user Authentication
and Session key establishment between external agent
and a sensor in a secure manner. In terms of
computation and Communication costs, our proposed
protocol is efficient in terms of sensor node
computation and energy usage. Based on Author
knowledge this is first of its kind protocol which is
most secure low cost, user authentication and key
establishment protocol.

Node Colluding Attack occurs when two nodes
comes to an agreement to flood fraudulent messages
in to the WSN.
Countermeasure by our proposed protocol:
The base station maintains a unique secret key for
each sensor node in WSN. All the messages to a
sensor node from a base station are encrypted through
the secret key meant for that sensor node. Of course,
this increases burden on the base station but to avoid
colluding attack and the insider attack, it is the best
possible solution.
VI. EFFICIENCY
PROTOCOL

OF

OUR
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